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IN T'HE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN T. JOHNSON, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. 
I 
DONALD J. JOHNSON, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
11110 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Appeal in this case pertains to a Decree of 
Divorce made and entered by the District Court of 
Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On September 21, 1967, in a default divorce hear-
ing at which the defendant was not present but which 
1 
was held pur.suant to stipulation, the District Court 
granted plaintiff a divorce. It also awarded her thr 
alimony, child support, and personal property which 
the parties had agreed upon in a formalized "Stipula-
tion and Property Settlement Agreement" betweeu 
them. (R 44-54) At a "continuation" hearing on 
October 6, 1967, initiated by plaintiff, the District 
Court, over the objection of defendant, awarded plain-
tiff a 25% interest in some real property which was 
not included in the formalized "Stipulation and Prop-
erty Settlement Agreement" but which had been con-
veyed to defendant by his parents subsequent thereto 
and just eight days prior to the original default hearing 
on the divorce (R 55-72). 
Subsequently, on November 28, 1967, the District 
Court signed the Decree of Divorce and denied de-
fendant's Motion in the alternative to: 
( 1) Base its "Findings", "Conclusions" and "De-
cree" solely on the "Stipulation and Property Settle-
ment Agreement"; or 
( 2) Grant a new hearing and trial so that all 
matters concerning both the "properties" and "obliga· 
tions" of defendant may be considered and that all facts 
concerning the need for child support and alimony and 
the ability of defendant to pay said child support and 
alimony may be considered. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The relief sought in this Appeal is either a modifi-
cation of the Divorce Decree so as to eliminate there-
from the real property which the District Court 
awarded plaintiff which had been conveyed to defend-
ant by his parents just eight days before the default 
hearing on the divorce, or, a new trial in which all the 
facts and circumstances bearing on a fair, just and 
equitable award of alimony and child support as well 
as a division of property between the parties can be 
heard and determined. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint for a divorce from 
defendant on February 1, 1967, (R 1) to which de-
feudant filed an answer on February 9, 1967, (R 5) 
and a subsequent Answer on March 6, 1967. 
Recognizing that their marital differences were 
irreconcilable the parties thereafter ,stipulated to a 
default hearing on the divorce and also agreed upon 
what alimony, child support, and property might be 
awarded plaintiff. This agreement was reduced to writ-
ing in a formalized "Stipulation and Property Settle-
ment Agreement". (R 20-21) 
Pursuant to the stipulation between them the 
dirorce was heard by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins, 
District Judge, as a def a ult divorce on September 21, 
HH\7. (R 44-54) At that hearing Judge Wilkins 
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granted plaintiff a divorce. He also awarded her the 
alimony, child support, and personal property which 
the parties had agreed might be awarded her in the 
formalized "Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement" between them. 
After the original hearing on the divorce, plaintiff 
initiated and secured a "continuation" hearing which 
was held on October 6, 1967. Her sole purpose for this 
so-called "continuation" hearing was to have the Court 
award her, besides the alimony, child support and per· 
sonal property which it had already awarded her 
pursuant to the "Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement", an interest in the real property which 
defendant's parents had conveyed to him just eight days 
before the original default divorce hearing. (R 54-72) 
Plaintiff was successful in her endeavors. In spite 
of defendant's objections, the District Court on Novem-
ber 28, 1967, signed the "Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law" and the "Decree". By this Divorce 
Decree the District Court awarded plaintiff alimony, 
child support and personal property based solely on 
the "Stipulation and. Property Settlement Agreement", 
and, in addition thereto, a 25% interest in real property 
which defendant's parents had conveyed to him. Other 
than what the parties stipulated to, there was never 
any hearing relative to plaintiff's needs for alimony 
and child support and what would be a fair and equit-
able division of the property between them, or hearing 
relative to defendant's ability to pay alimony and child 
support. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION BY MAKING AN AW ARD OF ALI-
MONY, CHILD SUPPORT, AND A DIVISION 
OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE STIPU-
LATION OF THE PARTIES WITHOUT 
HEARING AND CONSIDERING ALL THE 
APP L I CA B L E FACTS AND CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
In a divorce proceeding the District Court may 
make such orders as are equitable with reference to 
alimony, child support, and a division of property 
between the parties. This inherent authority is expressly 
conferred upon the Court by the provisions of 30-3-5 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides in part as 
follows: 
"\Vhen a decree of divorce is made the Court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable; ... " 
In exercising such authority it is unquestioned 
that the court is not bound by the stipulation of the 
parties. See in this connection Madsen vs. Madsen, 
2 U. (2d) 423, 276 P (2d) 917, Callister vs. Callister, 
I U (2d) 34, 261 P (2d) 944. The stipulation of the 
parties serves only as a recommendation. It is respect-
fully submitted, however, that if the court does not 
~ee fit to go along with the recommendation of the 
parties as set forth in their stipulation, the court should 
5 
hear and consider all applicable facts and circumstances. 
This was not done in the subject case. 
The divorce started out as a contested case. Later 
the parties stipulated it could be heard as a defaul; 
case. They also stipulated as to alimony, child support, 
and a property division. (R 21-22) It was in fact heard 
as a default divorce on September 21, 1967. At that 
hearing the court granted plaintiff a divorce. It also 
accepted the recommendation of the parties and award-
ed plaintiff the alimony, child support and property 
agreed upon and as was set forth in the formalized 
"Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement''. 
(R 44 54). 
Before the Findings, Conclusions and Decree were 
signed, however, in an unorthodox maneuver not pro-
vided for by the Statutes or Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiff's attorney got the Court to have what he 
designated as a "continuation" hearing on October 6, 
1967. The language of plaintiff's counsel as set forth 
in the record at Page 56 is immuminating: 
MR. HAYNIE: May the record show that 
this is a continuation called at the request of 
plaintiff of a hearing heretofore held prior to 
determination of this matter for the purpose of 
introducing certain evidence and for the purpose 
of ex-mining findings by the Court prior to 
filing of the findings which have not yet beeu 
filed. 
'Vhen the Court queried counsel further as to the exact 
nature of this so-called "continuation" hearing he re· 
plied: (R 58) 
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MR. HAYNIE: All right. The amendment 
which we would like to have made is to permit 
the stipulation to be set aside and to be amend-
so as to make provision for the disposition of 
real estate which was in the hands of the defend-
ant and undisclosed to the plaintiff at the time 
of that stipulation. 
Plaintiff's counsel deviously tried to create the 
impression that defendant had misled everyone, includ-
ing the Court, as to the property which he owned at 
the time of the stipulation. He stated to the Court: 
(R 60) 
MR. HAYNIE : If the Court, please, we took 
the deposition of the defendant. He said he had 
no real property. We had a prior hearing before 
Judge Anderson and he said there was no prop-
erty. She testified she entered into this stipula-
tion that there was no property. We want the 
evidence introduced and the Court to determine 
whether or not she has an interest. 
All of the aforesaid facts are true. Defendant did not 
own any real property at the time his deposition was 
taken. He did not own any real property at the pl'.ior 
hearing before Judge Anderson. He did not own any 
rea I property when he and plaintiff entered intq the 
stipulation between them. The stipulation was actually 
entered into prior to September 13, 1967. True, it was 
not signed until later, but, the parties had entered into 
the st ipulation before the 13th of September. Defend-
ant did not own any real property until after the 
stipulation was entered into, namely, until September 
n, 1967. It was then that defendant's parents con-
7 
veyed their interest in their home to him subject 1 
a life estate which they reserved unto themselves. 
0 
Admittedly, the Court has wide latitude and dis. 
cretion in determining the proper disposition of prop. 
erty in a divorce proceeding. See in this connectio11 
Wilson vs. Wilson, 296 P (2d) 977, 5 U (2d) 79, 
Blackham vs. Blackham, 230 P ( 2d) 566, 119 U 593, 
Tresnayne vs Tresnayne, 211 P ( 2d) 452, 116 U 483, 
Anderson vs. Anderson, 138 P ( 2d) 252, 104 U 104, 
Bullen vs. Bullen, 262 P 292, 71 U 63 and Pinney 
vs. Pinney, 245 P 329, 66 U 612. However, as enunci· 
ated in the above cases, all of the facts and circumstanc~i 
should be considered. 
In this case defendant did not own any real property 
when the stipulation was entered into. He acquired 
some real property from his parents after he and hii 
wife had entered into a property settlement agreement. 
Plaintiff and defendant had not been living together 
for more than five years. (R 48) Defendant's parents 
were 81 and 76 respectively. (R 66). It was not until, 
after plaintiff and defendant had entered into their 
property settlement agreement that they conveyed the 
real property in question to defendant. 
To make an award of alimony, child support and 
property based partly on a stipulation and partly ou 
testimony concerning only one isolated property trans· 
action without considering all the facts and circum· 
stances and without giving defendant an opportunity 
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to be heard on all these matters is a denial of due 
process and an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II. SINCE THE COURT REJECTED 
THE PARTIES' STIPULATION WITH REF-
ERENCE TO THE DISPOSITION OF THEIR 
PROPERTY IT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
A '\T ARDED PLAINTIFF ALIMONY BASED 
THEREON. 
The divorce was a default divorce and accordingly 
the Court did not hear and consider any evidence con-
cerning the need of plaintiff for alimony or the ability 
of defendant to pay alimony. It based its award 0£ 
alimony to plaintiff solely on the stipulation of the 
parties while at the same time it rejected the stipulation 
of the parties with reference to the disposition of their 
property. 
Defendant is and has been a real estate salesman 
For the past two years his total gross earnings were 
only approximately $425.00 per month. Plaintiff was 
and is gainfully employed and her admitted gross earn-
ings approximate $300.00 per month. Merely because 
defendant stipulated that plaintiff might be awarded 
$80.00 per month alimony does not mean that the facts 
justify such an award or that she needs that amount 
or that defendant can pay that amount. 
The Court should either have accepted the stipu-
lation of the parties concerning alimony, child support, 
and the disposition of the property of the parties or 
9 
it should have rejected the entire stipulation and 
received and considered evidence concerning all sucn 
matters, and entered its Decree based on such evidence. 1
1
1 
To reject defendant's attempt to submit such evidence 
for consideration was an abuse of its discretion. I 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and, based on I 
the evidence in the record and the law applicable there· 1 
to, Defendant-Appellant should be granted a new trial I 
or the Divorce Decree modified so as to exclude there· 
from the real property interest which the District Court 
awarded Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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Received copies of the fore going this ............ day 
of February, 1968. 
Louis M. Haynie 
Attomey for Plaintift'. 
Respondent 
